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On the night of December 29, 2007, Kenya seemed poised 
for that rarest of achievements in Africa, a peaceful handover of power to an 
opposition party in a democratic election. The opposition Orange Democratic 
Movement (ODM) had defeated the Party of National Unity (PNU) of incumbent 
president Mwai Kibaki in the parliamentary election, winning ninety-nine seats 
to forty-three. Raila Odinga, the ODM presidential candidate, was leading in the 
presidential vote count by more than a million votes. The next day, however, the 
Electoral Commission of Kenya announced that the sitting president had been 
reelected by a margin of fewer than a quarter million votes.1 In a hastily arranged 
ceremony closed to the public, Kibaki was sworn in for a second term. The coun-
try exploded.
Through the months of January and February 2008, some fifteen hundred peo-
ple were killed and five hundred thousand displaced from their homes in violence 
fueled by outrage over the stolen election.2 As the killing and burning spread 
across the country in early January, Kofi Annan, the former secretary-general of 
the United Nations, was called in to mediate between the two rival leaders and 
their parties. After exhausting negotiations, Annan brokered a deal at the end of 
February in which the two parties would form a “grand coalition” government 
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1. The Electoral Commission’s Web site lists a page for the 2007 results (www.eck.or.ke/index 
.php/Election-Results-Database).
2. For a good overview of the events of January and February, see Human Rights Watch, Ballots 
to Bullets: Organized Political Violence and Kenya’s Crisis of Governance, Human Rights Watch 
series, vol. 20, no. 1 (A), www.hrw.org/reports/2008/kenya0308.
Public Culture
1 0
of national unity. This cabinet was sworn in on April 17, with President Kibaki 
remaining as head of state and a new post of executive prime minister being cre-
ated for Odinga.3 On May 14 the new cabinet met for the first time, and Kenya 
once again had a government. Once again, incidentally, Kenya has no formal par-
liamentary opposition. At the top of the new government’s agenda is the difficult 
task of repairing the social damage caused by the postelection violence. 
Kenyans as well as outside observers were shocked by the rapidity of the coun-
try’s collapse into chaos in early January 2008. For decades Kenya had seemed 
the stable exception in a region racked with civil war and ethnic conflict, a haven 
for refugees from other parts of Africa — Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and 
Uganda — not a source of strife in its own right. Despite a long history of “eth-
nic clashes,” most Kenyans seemed reasonably comfortable in recognizing one 
another as both Kenyans and members of different “tribes.” Kenyans carry a 
national identity card listing their affiliation to one of “forty-two tribes,” though 
few can name them all, and occasionally another group voices a demand for tribal 
recognition.4 In the chaos that followed the announcement of the poll results, 
warnings of “another Rwanda” in the making were commonplace. For while out-
rage over the stolen election sparked the violence, there were undeniably ethnic 
aspects to the killing. Yet while there was no Rwanda-style genocide, most of the 
violent clashes occurred along ethnic lines. The ethnic dimensions, however, were 
not the same in all instances.5
Broadly speaking, five types of ethnic conflict marked the aftermath of the 
3. The cabinet was finally sworn in with forty ministers (twenty from each side) and fifty-two 
assistant ministers, almost half the total number of members of Parliament (MPs). The cost of run-
ning such an enormous executive will consume much of the discretionary funds in the Kenyan bud-
get. The Daily Telegraph estimated that “of Kenya’s annual budget of £5.4 billion, more than £4.3 
billion will go on 93 ministers and their government’s general running costs. Only £1.3 billion will 
be left for roads, schools and hospitals for Kenya’s 38 million people” (Mike Pflanz, “Kenya’s Cabi-
net Soaks Up 80% of Budget,” Daily Telegraph, April 18, 2008, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world 
news/1895899/Kenya%27s-cabinet-%27soaks-up-80pc-of-the-budget%27.html).
4. For a discussion of the Sengwer and their efforts to gain official recognition, see Gabrielle 
Lynch, “Negotiating Ethnicity: Identity Politics in Contemporary Kenya,” Review of African Politi-
cal Economy 107 (2006): 49 – 65.
5. John Lonsdale has famously argued for a distinction between “moral ethnicity” — “a process 
of ‘ourselves-ing’ ” — and the “othering” force of “political tribalism” (“Moral and Political Argu-
ment in Kenya,” in Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa, ed. Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh, and Will 
Kymlicka [Oxford: Currey; Athens: Ohio University Press, 2004], 76). In Lonsdale’s view, the for-
mer provides communities with resources for resisting the totalizing inclinations of the state. The 
latter is a weapon most serviceable to the holders of power within the state and to those contending 
for it. The ethnic conflicts I describe herein could all be considered forms of political tribalism. Little 
morality can be found in them.
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6. See Boubacar Ndiaye, “How Not to Institutionalize Civilian Control: Kenya’s Coup Prevention 
Strategies, 1964 – 1997,” Armed Forces and Society 28 (2002): 619 – 40.
7. See “Kenya Police Commander Says She Ordered Shooting of Protesters,” Associated Press, 
January 16, 2008, www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/01/16/africa/AF-GEN-Kenya-Open-Fire.php.
elections: ethnically targeted state repression; targeting of local ethnic proxies 
for national political figures; ethnic vigilantism; opportunistic criminal violence 
(some of which, it should be pointed out, was not ethnically motivated); and eth-
nic cleansing by Kalenjin ethnonationalists. In this essay I anatomize the post-
election violence in Kenya to identify the different forms of ethnic conflict so as 
to analyze the implications for the future stability of a democratic regime in the 
country. None of these forms of violence is unique to Kenya. Numerous examples 
of similar conflicts can be found in many parts of the world, particularly in con-
texts of emerging democracies following authoritarian rule. Since the Kenyan 
case of Kalenjin nationalism is relatively unfamiliar in the literature on ethnic 
nationalism, however, I focus here on the historical specifics of this case.
. . . . . . . . .
The first and perhaps most straightforward type of violence marking the postelec-
tion period involved police suppression of protests around the country in defense 
of what had become an ethnically exclusive regime. Virtually everyone killed or 
injured by a bullet in the weeks after the election was shot by officers of the state. 
(Favored weapons of nonstate actors included arrows, pangas [machetes], stones, 
and fire.) Immediately after the election results were made public, the opposition 
cried foul and announced a program of protest. In response, the newly reinstalled 
president proclaimed a ban on all political gatherings and ordered the security 
forces of the police and the paramilitary General Service Unit (GSU) to clamp 
down on dissent. The GSU is an elite force created by Jomo Kenyatta in a deliber-
ate effort to deter potential coup plotters within the military.6 Kenyatta stacked the 
GSU leadership with Kikuyus; Daniel arap Moi, the second president, appointed 
members of his tribe, the Kalenjin. Kibaki and his allies no doubt have done some-
thing similar to secure the loyalty of this key security force. Numerous reports 
document police failing to act against members of their own ethnic groups or act-
ing harshly against others. In the worst incident, police in Kisumu killed forty-four 
people on December 29 as they protested delays in releasing the election results. 
The chief of police admitted that she had given “shoot to kill” orders.7 In January 
the army was briefly deployed to quell fighting in Naivasha and Nakuru and to 
secure the road from the coast through to the north of the country and the central 
African states beyond, but the soldiers were rapidly returned to their barracks.
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The second type of conflict involved violent protests targeting Kikuyu persons 
and property as proxy attacks on the president and his party. These clashes were 
particularly intense in the Luo districts of western Kenya but were also com-
mon in Nairobi and the Rift Valley. Local and international observers typically 
referred to these incidents as “intercommunal violence,” a phrase that should be 
used judiciously, though the fact remains that many of the perpetrators acted with 
the support of their communities. The logic of these attacks seems to have been 
the conviction that Kikuyus were valid targets, as they either voted for Kibaki or 
stood to benefit from his victory, as they had in the past. The Luo people, the story 
went, had been robbed of their chance, so long postponed, to eat of the state. As 
the weeks dragged on, it was rare to find Kikuyu leaders or intellectuals speak-
ing out against the fraudulent election, confirming for many the communal basis 
of the theft. Leaders of virtually every other ethnic group in Kenya were critical 
of the results. Luos, however, were not the only people involved in such proxy 
attacks. As one young man told me at the time, echoing a widespread sentiment: 
“It’s all tribes against one.”
The third type of conflict arose in response to the targeting of Kikuyus and 
involved fights among groups of young men organized into ethnic vigilante gangs. 
These were primarily identified as Luo or Kikuyu. Clashes between such gangs 
were concentrated in the Nairobi slums, although similar clashes occurred in 
towns of the Rift Valley, such as Nakuru and Naivasha, between Kikuyu and 
Kalenjin (as well as Luo and Luhya) youths. These gangs set about segregating 
residential territories along ethnic lines and defending their turf from outsiders. 
As the violence spread, rumors abounded about the activities of the Mungiki, 
a Kikuyu ethnic militia known for its practice of “oathing” in a manner remi-
niscent of the nationalist fighters of the Mau Mau rebellion. For a time under 
Moi’s regime, the Mungiki were provided with a degree of state support, but in 
recent years they were outlawed and retreated to running a protection racket in 
the matatu transport sector and in urban slums. Mungiki were also subjected to a 
brutal assault by police, who, according to some observers, took advantage of the 
mandate to eliminate the Mungiki and engaged in a spree of extrajudicial killings 
targeting people who were not always associated with the organization. In Janu-
ary rumors surfaced, reported by the BBC, that the state was once again collabo-
rating with Mungiki.8 Almost certainly, young men associated with the movement 
8. See BBC News, “State ‘Sanctioned’ Kenyan Clashes,” March 5, 2008, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
africa/7279149.stm.
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were involved in the fighting. Visiting Naivasha in March with a colleague, I was 
told by young men about the arrival of Mungiki at the height of the violence and 
their insistence that all Kikuyu men join them in the battle. As with such rumors 
in time of war, the reality of a concerted organization by Mungiki was probably 
less significant than the fantasy suggested. The fantasy alone, however, can be 
enormously destructive.
The fourth type of conflict in the aftermath of the election involved opportu-
nistic crimes. In the later weeks of February it became clear that ordinary crimi-
nals were also taking advantage of the anarchic circumstances and overstretched 
police and looting Indian traders’ stores or the homes and businesses of members 
of their own and other communities. Reports from the western city of Kisumu 
suggested that looting was particularly rampant there, with Indian shopkeepers 
decamping for the safety of Uganda — no small irony considering the history of 
the Indian community in that country. Women and girls were targets of sexual 
violence and, when living as ethnic outsiders in refugee camps, were preyed on by 
men of all ethnic persuasions. The extent of disorder also led to some ambiguity 
in placing blame for the murders of political figures. For example, two opposi-
tion members of Parliament were killed in circumstances that among their allies 
raised suspicions of security force involvement and allowed the state to claim that 
criminals had murdered them.9
The fifth type of conflict in the crisis of the postelection period, and the most 
ominous for the future of Kenya, was marked by a resurgent Kalenjin ethno-
nationalism that motivated a renewed campaign of ethnic cleansing of Kikuyus 
by Kalenjins in the Rift Valley. This violence caused the highest number of deaths 
and displacements and now poses the greatest long-term risk to the stability of 
the state. In the Rift Valley, the stolen election was a pretext to drive Kikuyu 
“settlers” from areas of the Rift Valley deemed to belong to “the Kalenjin,” a 
struggle that has deep historical roots. White farmers in the colonial era typically 
imported Kikuyu farmworkers, many of whom in the independence era remained 
(though many were expelled in the Mau Mau Emergency of the 1950s). In the 
postindependence era, tens of thousands of landless Kikuyu were resettled on 
ex-settler properties in the Rift Valley. In 1991, with the dawn of “multiparty 
democracy,” Kalenjin politicians in the Rift Valley orchestrated clashes to secure 
9. Five people were arrested on charges of murder and robbery in connection with the theft of 
a cell phone and KSh20,000 from ODM Embakasi MP Mellitus Were; a traffic officer in Eldoret 




the power of then president Moi.10 Supporters of the ruling party, the Kenya Afri-
can National Union (KANU), led by politicians in Moi’s inner circle, worried 
that opposition parties were attracting strong support from the Kikuyu. They 
organized squads of young men to attack Kikuyu residents in the Rift Valley, 
particularly around the towns of Eldoret and Molo, to drive out potential opposi-
tion voters and intimidate those who remained. Their strategy, by all accounts 
supported by the president himself, was successful. Moi won himself ten more 
years as president by means of “clashes” such as these (though he also bribed vot-
ers and officials, repressed dissenters, and rigged his way through elections). At 
each election since 1992 —1997, 2002, and 2007 — ethnic clashes have occurred 
in the Rift Valley.11 In each instance the primary perpetrators were people calling 
themselves “Kalenjin,” and the principal victims were Kikuyu, although many 
innocent Kalenjin were also targets of retaliatory killings.
Yet while there is a surface similarity to the recurring ethnic conflicts sur-
rounding elections in the Rift Valley, the 2008 conflicts differed from earlier 
clashes in crucial respects. Unlike previous episodes of ethnic violence in the Rift 
Valley, the mobilization of fighters in 2008 was not organized solely by politi-
cal leaders seeking to manipulate the ethnic logic of electoral politics to retain 
power. Rather, the emerging Kalenjin political leadership, while perhaps instigat-
ing some violent clashes, took advantage of the widespread attacks on Kikuyus in 
the region, which arose more or less spontaneously with mostly local and unco-
ordinated mobilization, and the resulting retaliations against Kalenjin to secure 
their positions as spokespersons for the Kalenjin.12 The 2007 election marks a 
10. For an exhaustive account of the advent of multipartyism and an analysis of the Kenyan state 
under Kenyatta and Moi, see David Throup and Charles Hornsby, Multi-party Politics in Kenya: 
The Kenyatta and Moi States and the Triumph of the System in the 1992 Election (Oxford: Currey, 
1998).
11. For accounts of earlier conflicts, see Jacqueline Klopp, “Can Moral Ethnicity Trump Political 
Tribalism? The Struggle for Land and Nation in Kenya,” African Studies 61 (2002): 269 – 94; Klopp, 
“ ‘Ethnic Clashes’ and Winning Elections: The Case of Kenya’s Electoral Despotism,” Canadian 
Journal of African Studies 35 (2001): 473 – 517; and Gabrielle Lynch, “Kenyan Politics and the Eth-
nic Factor: The Case of the Kalenjin” (DPhil thesis, Oxford University, May 2007).
12. Debate over the degree of organization involved in the Rift Valley battles is unlikely to be 
resolved. The degree of grassroots Kalenjin support for the expulsion of Kikuyu is evident in that, 
despite a new policy to support and protect returnees, few displaced families have been permitted 
by their former neighbors to return home. In March 2008, during interviews in the Nakuru district, 
I heard some accounts of preparation for violence suggesting that circumcision schools for Kalenjin 
boys had been held early to prepare them for the election period. That is, moving up the date of the 
circumcision rituals meant that the boys would not be in seclusion at the time of the election and 
could be organized into a militia force during their circumcision training.
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13. For the most comprehensive account of the making of the Kalenjin and Moi’s place in that 
history, see Lynch, “Ethnic Factor.”
14. Kenyatta parlayed state power into political and financial advantage for his relatives and the 
Kikuyu economic elite, while opening preferential access to land, jobs, and business opportunities 
for Kikuyus more generally, among whom could be found both the earliest beneficiaries and the 
fiercest opponents of colonial rule. For a discussion of the differences between Kenyatta’s rule and 
Moi’s, see Throup and Hornsby, Multi-party Politics in Kenya.
changing of the guard in Kalenjin leadersip. Electors comprehensively repudiated 
former president Moi and his family. Moi had been the central figure in Kalenjin 
life for more than a half century. Indeed, the very existence of “the Kalenjin” as 
a plausible ethnic category may owe more to Moi than to anyone else.13 Shortly 
before the election, Moi came out in support of Kibaki. The general response 
among Kalenjin voters, however, was derision. Many people assumed Moi had 
made a deal with Kibaki to secure immunity for himself in corruption cases that 
the opposition might be expected to prosecute if they gained office.
In 2007, for the first time since Moi gained the vice presidency after indepen-
dence, the Kalenjin as a community entered the elections feeling excluded from the 
inner sanctums of the state. For some years prior to the elections, Kalenjin nation-
alism was marked by a collective ressentiment directed primarily at Kikuyu but 
expressed in frustration at Moi. During his years in office Moi perfected the prac-
tice of patrimonial ethnic politics initiated by his predecessor, Jomo Kenyatta.14 
When Moi was forced from office in 2002, however, and his chosen successor, 
Uhuru Kenyatta, was defeated in the polls, his former supporters began not only 
to resent being excluded from the main sources of patronage opportunities but 
also to critically reassess the spoils that they had received when “Uncle Dan” 
was in office. A consensus emerged that Moi had dispensed favors primarily to a 
select group of cronies, while benefiting to an unfair degree the Tugen “subtribe” 
of the Kalenjin at the expense of other groups, particularly the larger Nandi group. 
He was also seen to have continued aiding Kikuyus at Kalenjin expense.
Rather than follow the instructions of their former leader and deliver their 
votes to Kibaki, Kalenjin districts voted overwhelmingly for the opposition. Two 
of Moi’s sons were also humiliated in their election attempts. In the postelection 
violence, locals took the opportunity to burn some of Moi’s properties and those 
of their impoverished Kikuyu neighbors. The most notable Kalenjin leader is now 
William Ruto, allied to ODM leader Odinga. Although he is seen in some quar-
ters as a violence-inciting warlord, Ruto claims the mantle of Kalenjin leadership 
because he delivered their votes for the ODM. As the Kalenjin lawyer and colum-
nist Donald Kipkorir pronounced in April 2008: “In unanimity, Kalenjins have 
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chosen Mr Ruto their leader, and on their behalf will he sit at the nation-state table 
to represent their interests.”15 In the negotiations leading to the “grand coalition” 
government, Ruto was backed by the implicit threat that his community, if left 
dissatisfied, would resume its violent struggles.
In March 2008 I traveled to the Rift Valley district of Nakuru with a colleague 
to visit my in-laws and to report on the aftermath of the violence.16 On the way to 
Nakuru we stopped outside Gilgil at the farm of J. M. Kariuki, the socialist politi-
cian assassinated in 1975 after falling out with President Kenyatta. Thirty Kalen-
jin families, who had lived on the property for generations, since before Kariuki 
bought it from a white farmer at independence, had been burned out and chased 
away by Kikuyus in revenge for attacks on Kikuyus farther north. The houses had 
been small structures of mud and thatch. Nothing remained but scorched ground. 
The locals we met expressed sorrow at the plight of their neighbors and insisted 
that the perpetrators came from far away. Later that day we toured farms in the 
Rongai district outside Nakuru where Kikuyu homes had been burned. Some mud 
walls remained standing; everything that could be stolen or burned was gone. 
Thousands of Kikuyu had also been displaced from their homes in the surround-
ing countryside and were living in refugee camps in the Nakuru Agricultural 
Showgrounds and the stadium.
None of the Kalenjins we spoke with in the Rift Valley evinced any sympathy 
for his or her missing neighbors. During my previous visit, in the northern sum-
mer of 2007, relations between the two groups in the district had not seemed 
particularly troubled. Indeed, my Kalenjin in-laws were not alone in having 
close friends, lovers, and co-parents from the Kikuyu community. On my visit in 
March, however, I found the ruined houses of people I had thought of as family 
friends along with those of many other neighbors. The consensus after the 2007 
election was that Kikuyu did not belong in this part of the world. “This is Kalenjin 
territory,” was a steady refrain. One woman insisted to us that the Kikuyu actu-
ally belonged in Congo, whence they had been imported by white farmers in the 
days of colonialism.
. . . . . . . . .
Central to the question of ethnic identity in Kenya is the politics of land. Six 
decades of British rule, of identifying peoples with territories in sharper distinc-
15. Donald Kipkorir, “Casting the First Stone,” April 6, 2008, kenyaimagine.blogspot 
.com/2008/04/casting-first-stone.html.
16. My thanks to Robert Blunt of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Chicago 
for sharing on this trip his extraordinary knowledge of Kenyan history, culture, and politics.
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tions than had been known before and of exploiting cultural difference in the 
service of ruling through the offices of local “tribal” authorities, laid the founda-
tion for postindependence subnational collective identities.17 At the same time, 
however, the British undermined the potential for establishing exclusive ethnic 
homelands, such as those in South Africa, by facilitating the creation of private 
property, with individual tenure, of communal land and opening vast tracts in the 
Highlands to capitalist commercial agriculture, making the ownership of land 
the keystone of the economy. In the postindependence era, this property regime 
remained largely intact, albeit with the substitution of African landholders for 
white settlers. The families of independent Kenya’s three presidents, curiously 
enough, are the largest landholders in the country. The Kenyattas own more than 
five hundred thousand acres of agricultural land. Most of the rest of the arable 
land, which comprises about a fifth of the country, is held by cronies of presidents, 
while 80 percent of the country either is landless or occupies land sufficient only 
for residential and bare subsistence purposes.18
Decades of illegal and irregular land transactions, coupled with a chroni-
cally dysfunctional cadastral bureaucracy, have corrupted Kenya’s whole system 
of landholding.19 The ninety-nine-year leases issued by the colonial authorities 
have now expired, casting doubt on the security of tenure and the viability of 
mortgages of a huge number of properties, from family subsistence farms in the 
Rift Valley to multinational corporate plantations and swathes of downtown Nai-
robi.20 Despite a constant refrain to “recognize the sanctity of title,” most recently 
echoed by President Kibaki after the minister of lands announced the revocation 
of all colonial-era leases, virtually no one can say for certain whether the title to 
17. The mapping of each tribe to its territory was formalized in the Carter Commission’s boundary- 
setting work of 1933. See Report of the Kenya Land Commission, September 1933 [Carter Commis-
sion Report] (London: HMSO, 1934).
18. For a description of their enormous holdings, derived from “close to a year of interviews with 
farm staff, independent surveyors, Ministry of Lands experts and land rights NGOs,” since public 
records are not available, see Otsieno Namwaya, “Who Owns Kenya?” Standard, October 1, 2004.
19. See Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land 
[Ndungu Commission Report] (Nairobi: Government Printer, 2004).
20. Shortly after being appointed minister of lands, James Orengo announced that these leases, 
most issued prior to 1909, had lapsed and that the land would revert to the state. This caused panic 
among landholders and financiers until the president announced, off the cuff at an independence day 
rally, that the leases could be renewed. The situation, however, remains unclear. See Peter Opiyo, 
“Warning over Idle Land,” Standard, May 22, 2008; Alex Ndewa, “Daggers Are Drawn over Policy 
on Land,” Standard, May 26, 2008; and Kenneth Ogosia, “Kibaki Relaxes Orengo’s Tough Land 
Rules,” Daily Nation, June 2, 2008.
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the land he or she occupies is valid.21 Thousands of acres of land formerly held 
in communal tenure under trust have been illegally expropriated by politically 
connected individuals.22 Millions of people, as the recent violence demonstrates, 
feel passionately about their connection to ethnically defined territory but hold no 
economically viable property in land. A draft national land policy has been tabled 
in an effort to begin sorting out the mess that is the land issue in Kenya.23 There 
is a reasonable chance that the policy will be legislated in the near future, though 
some aspects will require constitutional reform. Implementing such a policy, how-
ever, will be a Sisyphean labor.
. . . . . . . . .
Insofar as the conflicts of January and February 2008 involved aggrieved sup-
porters of Odinga’s ODM, Luos, and others battling police or targeting Kikuyus 
as supporters of President Kibaki, the prospects for reconciliation are reasonably 
good. By accepting the post of prime minister in the grand coalition government, 
Odinga signaled that, whatever benefits the country as a whole might possibly 
gain in terms of improved governance or new policies, his supporters and his 
“community” would be rewarded with a seat at the table when the national cake 
was divided up. His political future will depend to a great extent on how suc-
cessful he is in convincing these supporters that he has served them well as Luos 
while cutting whatever deals are necessary with the Kikuyu and other “tribes.”
As for the conflicts that involved ethnic cleansing in the Rift Valley, however, 
the prospects for reconciliation are slim, and the implications for the future of 
the country are grim. The refugee camps established during the fighting, housing 
some three hundred thousand people, are now being dismantled, forcing refugees 
either to return home or to seek shelter elsewhere. Few are returning to the con-
tested zones of the Rift Valley.
In some districts of the Rift Valley virtually no Kikuyu residents are left. The 
ethnic cleansing of Kikuyus from Kalenjin territory is seen almost without excep-
tion, by Kalenjin, as a good thing. In conversations with Kalenjin in the Nakuru 
district in March 2008, I met only one person who expressed discontent with the 
course of events, and she was a local politician in the town of Mogotio who had 
21. More than two hundred thousand illegal titles were estimated to exist (Ndungu Commission 
Report, 57). Hundreds of thousands of landholders in the settlement schemes are still awaiting titles 
to land decades after taking occupation.
22. Ndungu Commission Report, 139.
23. Kenya Land Alliance and Ministry of Lands, Draft National Land Policy (Nairobi: National 
Land Policy Secretariat, n.d.).
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been forced into hiding because of her unpopular views. Even those not actively 
engaged in perpetrating or supporting the violence have little sympathy for the 
people whose relatives were killed and whose houses were burned and properties 
ransacked. The displaced will not be welcomed home. Moreover, since the leader-
ship of the state has little local influence, attempts to forcibly resettle displaced 
people are highly unlikely to succeed.
As with those who fled their homes during previous ethnic clashes in the Rift 
Valley, most will probably end up landless tenants in their ethnic heartlands or 
among the unemployed in slums and shantytowns in the capital and regional cit-
ies. Most of the displaced were involved in subsistence food production. From 
what my colleague and I saw, none of the plots abandoned by Kikuyu farmers 
was being prepared for the planting season. Aid organizations are warning of 
impending food shortages.24 Since the land claimed as Kalenjin territory includes 
large portions of the country’s viable commercial agricultural land (with most 
of the rest in the Central Province, to which the displaced Kikuyus were told to 
decamp), it is hard to imagine that the recent violence has improved the potential 
for stimulating much-needed investment in agricultural production. A hardening 
of attitudes to ethnic territoriality bodes ill also for efforts to redistribute land and 
address problems of landlessness.
Unlike the eruption of talk of majimboism in 1991, when Kalenjin leaders 
deployed the rhetoric of regionalism as a weapon against “political pluralism” 
and multiparty democracy to maintain their power in the state, recent calls for 
majimbo seem to me more a grassroots popular sentiment fueled by resentment 
than a coherent political strategy for securing political power at the level of the 
national state.25 No one has yet articulated a viable plan for a regional political 
entity representing the ethnic homeland. In the ethnic arithmetic that constitutes 
the Kenyan electoral system, the Kalenjin, like other smaller “tribes,” are not well 
positioned to enjoy the fruits of state power. The destructive potential of their 
ethnonationalism, as seen in the recent violence, is enormous.
24. In April 2008 the United Nations’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
launched an appeal for $189 million in relief for Kenya. UN News Centre, “Kenya Facing Food 
Shortage Because of Rising Prices — UN Aid Officials,” April 18, 2008, www.un.org/apps/news/
story.asp?NewsID=26388&Cr=food&Cr1=.
25. See Klopp, “Ethnic Clashes.”

